Harvard的雲端百科工坊

寫盡一堆筆
H：從年初寫東寫西，算算竟也寫完264支筆，汗顏。今天再去訂買二百支筆，準備明年寫完三百支筆。30孔A4筆記本及資料卡準備各七十本。網路稱一筆寫萬字。日寫夜寫，看電視也寫，出門走馬看花也寫。古人報效國家，稱為「投筆從戎」。現在不太尊重軍人，從軍都被當傻瓜，當兵者少。而且當兵不如讀大學的其他科系！有其天花板的限制。權及錢沒有，總統及大老闆也當不了。何須論及「馬革裹屍」？以前軍人「責任擔當､甚麼叫做犧牲､團結，一體同命，大部分的人在軍中學習到的是如何忍耐､刻苦､生存，能夠平安退伍的人們都學會了妥協和自保，如何遵守紀律和服從。」風險與平安只是一線之隔。退伍後沒有競爭力，你的優秀，已被軍磨盡，因為限制太多，缺少非正軌訓練，會了戰技和戰術，少了政治家的權謀及詐術。麥克阿瑟軍權至高，最後只能留下一句「老兵不死，只是逐漸凋零」，又有何用？報國不止一途，選培養服千萬人之務的重擔更有意義。如果你有更優秀腦袋！收筆專心寫故事。下筆如有神則下筆千言，前提是「言之有物」，技多不壓身，自由書寫，終身學習不終止，人生有無限可能！才敢言「老兵不死」！20241204W3

網路資料
10000個字左右。

普通的中性筆當中，最常見的屬0.5mm的黑色中性筆，樣本中選取的就是平時較常見的0.5mm黑色中性筆芯。

標準中性筆是按照書寫長度來計算的，標準中性筆筆芯的書寫長度是500公尺。 根據中國漢字的書寫習慣，一般情況下我們書寫的漢字號是5號字，平均每個字的長度為0.05499米，按照書寫字數計算的話，應該是500/0.05499，計算得9092.56個字。 大約一萬字。

終身學習
終生學習、繼續教育（英語：Lifelong Learning），定義是「一輩子的學習」。近代世界因為知識和科技發展，經濟結構轉型，知識型經濟成為主流，就業需要相當知識，由於知識更替迅速，舊知識很快就被新知識取代，人們察覺到無法讀一門學科後，就一世無憂，因而衍生出終身學習的概念。

下筆千言
一揮筆即寫成上千字的文章。形容才思敏捷。《醒世恆言．卷七．錢秀才錯占鳳凰儔》：「下筆千言立就，揮毫四坐皆驚。」《醉醒石》第六回：「真是下筆千言，倚馬可待。」

投筆從戎
戎，指軍隊或戰爭。投筆從戎指棄文從軍。典出《後漢書．卷四十七．班超傳》。
【例】經過審慎的考慮，他決心投筆從戎，完成報效國家的心願。

投筆從戎
釋　　義戎，軍旅。「投筆從戎」指棄文從軍，以衛國立功。＃典出《東觀漢記．卷一六．班超列傳》。典故說明據《東觀漢記．卷一六．班超列傳》載，東漢時，班超因家境貧困，只好為官府抄寫書籍，賺取微薄薪水，以供養母親，貼補家用。有一天，他做得有些厭煩，便停止抄寫，將筆擱置於一旁，嘆息說：「大丈夫應效法傅介子、張騫等人，立功邊疆，保家衛國，怎能長久從事文書工作，將生命耗費在筆硯之間呢？」於是決定從軍報效國家。後來這個故事被濃縮成「投筆從戎」，用來指棄文從軍，以衛國立功。用法說明

語義說明

比喻棄文從軍，以衛國立功。褒義。

使用類別

用在「志向遠大」的表述上。

例句

好男兒，當自強，投筆從戎上戰場。

戰事一舉，他立即整裝返國投筆從戎。

為了抵抗外侮，許多青年紛紛投筆從戎。

隊上的幹部，大多是投筆從戎的年輕學生。

我長大以後也要學班超投筆從戎，報效國家。

戰爭爆發後，青年紛紛投筆從戎，奔赴前線。

如今國家有難，好男兒當投筆從戎，報考軍校。

抗戰時，許多在學青年毅然投筆從戎，加入抗日行列。

報國不一定要投筆從戎，在自己崗位上好好努力也是一樣。
老兵不死
「老戰士永不死」是英語的口號，完整版是「老兵不死，只是逐漸凋零」。它是由士兵的民俗歌曲《Old Soldiers Never Die》中的一段組成的：老兵永不死 永不死，永不死， 老兵永不死 它們只是消失了。[1]這首歌本身就是英國陸軍對福音歌曲《 Kind Thoughts Can Never Die》的改編。[2]

1951年4月19日,麥克阿瑟在國會大廈發表了題為《老兵不死》的著名演講

道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟將軍在1951年4月19日向美國國會發表的告別演說中使用了這句話（這場演說後來被稱為「老兵永不死」演說）：[3]

...「但我仍然記得那時最受歡迎的兵營民謠中的一句副歌，驕傲地宣稱『老兵不死，只是逐漸凋零。』
就像那首民謠中的老兵一樣，我現在結束了我的軍旅生涯，靜靜地消失，一位盡職盡責的老兵，因著上帝賜予他光明，看到他的職責。」

後漢書/卷47
後漢書

　郭陳列傳 ◄後漢書　卷四十七
班梁列傳　第三十七► 楊李翟應霍爰徐列傳　

姊妹計劃: 數據項

班超〈子勇〉　梁慬

目次

班超
班超字仲升，扶風平陵人，徐令彪之少子也。爲人有大志，不修細節。然內孝謹，居家常執勤苦，不恥勞辱。有口辯，而涉獵書傳。[1]永平五年，兄固被召詣校書郎，[2]超與母隨至洛陽。家貧，常爲官傭書以供養。乆勞苦，甞輟業投筆歎曰：「大丈夫無它志略，猶當效傅介子、張騫立功異域，以取封侯，安能乆事筆研閒乎？」[3]左右皆笑之。超曰：「小子安知壯士志哉！」其後行詣相者，曰：「祭酒，布衣諸生耳，[4]而當封侯萬里之外。」超問其狀。相者指曰：「生燕頷虎頸，飛而食肉，此萬里侯相也。」乆之，顯宗問固「卿弟安在」，固對「爲官寫書，受直以養老母」。帝乃除超爲蘭臺令史，[5]後坐事免官。

十六年，奉車都尉竇固出擊匈奴，以超爲假司馬，將兵別擊伊吾，戰於蒲類海，[6]多斬首虜而還。固以爲能，遣與從事郭恂俱使西域。

超到鄯善，[7]鄯善王廣奉超禮敬甚備，後忽更踈懈。超謂其官屬曰：「寧覺廣禮意薄乎？此必有北虜使來，狐疑未知所從故也。明者睹未萌，況已著邪。」乃召侍胡詐之曰：「匈奴使來數日，今安在乎？」侍胡惶恐，具服其狀。超乃閉侍胡，悉會其吏士三十六人，與共飲，酒酣，因激怒之曰：「卿曹與我俱在絕域，[8]欲立大功，以求富貴。今虜使到裁數日，而王廣禮敬即廢；如令鄯善収吾屬送匈奴，骸骨長爲豺狼食矣。爲之柰何？」官屬皆曰：「今在危亡之地，死生從司馬。」超曰：「不入虎穴，不得虎子。當今之計，獨有因夜以火攻虜，使彼不知我多少，必大震怖，可殄盡也。滅此虜，則鄯善破膽，功成事立矣。」衆曰：「當與從事議之。」超怒曰：「吉凶決於今日。從事文俗吏，聞此必恐而謀泄，死無所名，非壯士也！」衆曰：「善」。初夜，遂將吏士往奔虜營。會天大風，超令十人持鼓藏虜舍後，約曰：「見火然，皆當鳴鼓大呼。」餘人悉持兵弩夾門而伏。超乃順風縱火，前後鼓譟。虜衆驚亂，超手格殺三人，吏兵斬其使及從士三十餘級，餘衆百許人悉燒死。[9]明日乃還告郭恂，恂大驚，旣而色動。超知其意，舉手曰：「掾雖不行，班超何心獨擅之乎？」恂乃恱。超於是召鄯善王廣，以虜使首示之，一國震怖。超曉告撫慰，遂納子爲質。還奏於竇固，固大喜，具上超功效，並求更選使使西域。帝壯超節，詔固曰：「吏如班超，何故不遣而更選乎？今以超爲軍司馬，令遂前功。」超復受使，固欲益其兵，超曰：「願將本所從三十餘人足矣。如有不虞，多益爲累。」

是時於窴王廣德新攻破莎車，遂雄張南道，[10]而匈奴遣使監護其國。超旣西，先至於窴。廣德禮意甚踈。且其俗信巫。巫言：「神怒何故欲向漢？漢使有騧馬，[11]急求取以祠我。」廣德乃遣使就超請馬。超密知其狀，報許之，而令巫自來取馬。有頃，巫至，超即斬其首以送廣德，因辭讓之。廣德素聞超在鄯善誅滅虜使，大惶恐，即攻殺匈奴使者而降超。超重賜其王以下，因鎮撫焉。

時龜茲王建爲匈奴所立，倚恃虜威，據有北道，攻破疏勒，殺其王，[12]而立龜茲人兜題爲疏勒王。明年春，超從閒道至疏勒。去兜題所居槃橐城九十里，逆遣吏田慮先往降之。勑慮曰：「兜題本非疏勒種，國人必不用命。若不即降，便可執之。」慮旣到，兜題見慮輕弱，殊無降意。慮因其無備，遂前劫縛兜題。左右出其不意，皆驚懼奔走。慮馳報超，超即赴之，悉召疏勒將吏，說以龜茲無道之狀，因立其故王兄子忠爲王，[13]國人大恱。忠及官屬皆請殺兜題，超不聽，欲示以威信，釋而遣之。疏勒由是與龜茲結怨。

十八年，帝崩。焉耆以中國大喪，[14]遂攻沒都護陳睦。超孤立無援，而龜茲、姑墨數發兵攻疏勒。[15]超守盤橐城，與忠爲首尾，士吏單少，拒守歲餘。肅宗初即位，以陳睦新沒，恐超單危不能自立，下詔徵超。超發還，疏勒舉國憂恐。其都尉黎弇曰：「漢使棄我，我必復爲龜茲所滅耳。誠不忍見漢使去。」因以刀自剄。超還至於窴，王侯以下皆號泣曰：「依漢使如父母，誠不可去。」互抱超馬腳，不得行。超恐於窴終不聽其東，又欲遂本志，乃更還疏勒。疏勒兩城自超去後，復降龜茲，而與尉頭連兵。[16]超捕斬反者，擊破尉頭，殺六百餘人，疏勒復安。

建初三年，超率疏勒、康居、於窴、拘彌兵一萬人攻姑墨石城，[17]破之，斬首七百級。超欲因此叵平諸國，[18]乃上疏請兵。曰：「臣竊見先帝欲開西域，故北擊匈奴，西使外國，鄯善、於窴即時向化。今拘彌、莎車、疏勒、月氏、烏孫、康居復願歸附，欲共併力破滅龜茲，平通漢道。若得龜茲，則西域未服者百分之一耳。臣伏自惟念，卒伍小吏，實願從谷吉效命絕域，庶幾張騫棄身曠野。[19]昔魏絳列國大夫，尚能和輯諸戎，[20]況臣奉大漢之威，而無鈆刀一割之用乎？[21]前世議者皆曰取三十六國，號爲斷匈奴右臂。[22]今西域諸國，自日之所入，莫不向化，[23]大小欣欣，貢奉不絕，唯焉耆、龜茲獨未服從。臣前與官屬三十六人奉使絕域，備遭艱戹。自孤守疏勒，於今五載，胡夷情數，臣頗識之。問其城郭小大，皆言『倚漢與依天等』。以是效之，則蔥領可通，[24]蔥領通則龜茲可伐。今宜拜龜茲侍子白霸爲其國王，以步騎數百送之，與諸國連兵，歲月之間，龜茲可禽。以夷狄攻夷狄，計之善者也。[25]臣見莎車、疏勒田地肥廣，草牧饒衍，不比敦煌、鄯善間也，[26]兵可不費中國而糧食自足。且姑墨、溫宿二王，特爲龜茲所置，[27]旣非其種，更相厭苦，其埶必有降反。若二國來降，則龜茲自破。願下臣章，參考行事。誠有萬分，死復何恨。臣超區區，特蒙神靈，竊兾未便僵仆，目見西域平定，陛下舉萬年之觴，[28]薦勳祖廟，布大喜於天下。」[29]書奏，帝知其功可成，議欲給兵。平陵人徐幹素與超同志，上疏願奮身佐超。五年，遂以幹爲假司馬，將㢮刑及義從千人就超。

先是莎車以爲漢兵不出，遂降於龜茲，而疏勒都尉番辰亦復反叛。[30]會徐幹適至，超遂與幹擊番辰，大破之，斬首千餘級，多獲生口。超旣破番辰，欲進攻龜茲。以烏孫兵彊，宜因其力，乃上言：「烏孫大國，控弦十萬，故武帝妻以公主，[31]至孝宣皇帝，卒得其用。[32]今可遣使招慰，與共合力。」帝納之。八年，拜超爲將兵長史，假鼓吹幢麾。[33]以徐幹爲軍司馬，別遣衞候李邑護送烏孫使者，賜大小昆彌以下錦帛。[34]

李邑始到於窴，而值龜茲攻疏勒，恐懼不敢前，因上書陳西域之功不可成，又盛毀超擁愛妻，抱愛子，安樂外國，無內顧心。超聞之，歎曰：「身非曾參而有三至之讒，恐見疑於當時矣。」[35]遂去其妻。帝知超忠，乃切責邑曰：「縱超擁愛妻，抱愛子，思歸之士千餘人，何能盡與超同心乎？」令邑詣超受節度。詔超：「若邑任在外者，便留與從事。」超即遣邑將烏孫侍子還京師。徐幹謂超曰：「邑前親毀君，欲敗西域，今何不緣詔書留之，更遣它吏送侍子乎？」超曰：「是何言之陋也！以邑毀超，故今遣之。內省不疚，何卹人言！[36]快意留之，非忠臣也。」

明年，復遣假司馬和恭等四人將兵八百詣超，超因發疏勒、於窴兵擊莎車。莎車陰通使疏勒王忠，啖以重利[37]忠遂反從之，西保烏即城。超乃更立其府丞成大爲疏勒王，悉發其不反者以攻忠。積半歲，而康居遣精兵救之，超不能下。是時月氏新與康居婚，相親，超乃使使多齎錦帛遺月氏王，令曉示康居王，康居王乃罷兵，執忠以歸其國，烏即城遂降於超。

後三年，忠說康居王借兵，還據損中，[38]密與龜茲謀，遣使詐降於超。超內知其姦而外僞許之。忠大喜，即從輕騎詣超。超密勒兵待之，爲供張設樂。[39]酒行，乃叱吏縛忠斬之。因擊破其衆，殺七百餘人，南道於是遂通。

明年，超發於窴諸國兵二萬五千人，復擊莎車。而龜茲王遣左將軍發溫宿、姑墨、尉頭合五萬人救之。超召將校及於窴王議曰：「今兵少不敵，其計莫若各散去。於窴從是而東，長史亦於此西歸，可須夜鼓聲而發。」陰緩所得生口。龜茲王聞之大喜，自以萬騎於西界遮超，溫宿王將八千騎於東界徼於窴。超知二虜已出，密召諸部勒兵，雞鳴馳赴莎車營，胡大驚亂奔走，追斬五千餘級，大獲其馬畜財物。莎車遂降，龜茲等因各退散，自是威震西域。

初，月氏甞助漢擊車師有功，是歲貢奉珍寶、符拔、師子，[40]因求漢公主。超拒還其使，由是怨恨。永元二年，月氏遣其副王謝將兵七萬攻超。超衆少，皆大恐。超譬軍士曰：「月氏兵雖多，然數千里踰蔥領來，非有運輸，何足憂邪？但當收穀堅守，彼飢窮自降，不過數十日決矣。」謝遂前攻超，不下，又鈔掠無所得。超度其糧將盡，必從龜茲求救，乃遣兵數百於東界要之。謝果遣騎齎金銀珠玉以賂龜茲。超伏兵遮擊，盡殺之，持其使首以示謝。謝大驚，即遣使請罪，願得生歸。超縱遣之。月氏由是大震，歲奉貢獻。

明年，龜茲、姑墨、溫宿皆降，乃以超爲都護，徐幹爲長史。拜白霸爲龜茲王，遣司馬姚光送之。超與光共脅龜茲廢其王尤利多而立白霸，使光將尤利多還詣京師。超居龜茲它乾城，徐幹屯疏勒。西域唯焉耆、危須、尉犂以前沒都護，懷二心，其餘悉定。

六年秋，超遂發龜茲、鄯善等八國兵合七萬人，及吏士賈客千四百人討焉耆。兵到尉犂界，而遣曉說焉耆、尉犂、危須曰：「都護來者，欲鎮撫三國。即欲改過向善，宜遣大人來迎，[41]當賞賜王侯已下，事畢即還。今賜王綵五百匹。」焉耆王廣遣其左將北鞬支奉牛酒迎超。[42]超詰鞬支曰：「汝雖匈奴侍子，而今秉國之權。都護自來，王不以時迎，皆汝罪也。」或謂超可便殺之。超曰：「非汝所及。此人權重於王，今未入其國而殺之，遂令自疑，設備守險，豈得到其城下哉！」於是賜而遣之。廣乃與大人迎超於尉犂，奉獻珍物。

焉耆國有葦橋之險，廣乃絕橋，不欲令漢軍入國。超更從它道厲度。[43]七月晦，到焉耆，去城二十里，營大澤中。廣出不意，大恐，乃欲悉驅其人共入山保。焉耆左侯元孟先甞質京師，密遣使以事告超，超即斬之，示不信用。乃期大會諸國王，因揚聲當重加賞賜，於是焉耆王廣、尉犂王汎及北鞬支等三十人相率詣超。其國相腹乆等十七人懼誅，[44]皆亡入海，而危須王亦不至。坐定，超怒詰廣曰：「危須王何故不到？腹乆等所緣逃亡？」遂叱吏士收廣、汎等於陳睦故城，斬之，傳首京師。因縱兵鈔掠，斬首五千餘級，獲生口萬五千人，馬畜牛羊三十餘萬頭，更立元孟爲焉耆王。超留焉耆半歲，慰撫之。於是西域五十餘國悉皆納質內屬焉。

明年，下詔曰：「往者匈奴獨擅西域，寇盜河西，永平之末，城門晝閉。先帝深愍邊萌嬰羅寇害，乃命將帥擊右地，破白山，臨蒲類，[45]取車師，城郭諸國震慴響應，遂開西域，置都護。而焉耆王舜、舜子忠獨謀悖逆，恃其險隘，覆沒都護，並及吏士。先帝重元元之命，憚兵役之興，故使軍司馬班超安集於窴以西。超遂踰蔥領，迄縣度，[46]出入二十二年，莫不賔從。改立其王，而綏其人。不動中國，不煩戎士，得遠夷之和，同異俗之心，而致天誅，蠲宿恥，以報將士之讎。[47]《司馬法》曰：『賞不踰月，欲人速覩爲善之利也。』其封超爲定遠侯，邑千戶。」[48]

超自以乆在絕域，年老思土。十二年，上疏曰：「臣聞太公封齊，五世葬周，狐死首丘，代馬依風。[49]夫周齊同在中土千里之閒，況於遠處絕域，小臣能無依風首丘之思哉？蠻夷之俗，畏壯侮老。[50]臣超犬馬齒殲，常恐年衰，奄忽僵仆，孤魂棄捐。昔蘇武留匈奴中尚十九年，今臣幸得奉節帶金銀護西域，[51]如自以壽終屯部，誠無所恨，然恐後世或名臣爲沒西域。臣不敢望到酒泉郡，但願生入玉門關。[52]臣老病衰困，冒死瞽言，謹遣子勇隨獻物入塞。[53]及臣生在，令勇目見中土。」而超妹同郡曹壽妻昭亦上書請超曰：

妾同產兄西域都護定遠侯超，幸得以微功特蒙重賞，爵列通侯，位二千石。天恩殊絕，誠非小臣所當被蒙。超之始出，志捐軀命，兾立微功，以自陳效。會陳睦之變，道路隔絕，超以一身轉側絕域，曉譬諸國，因其兵衆，每有攻戰，輒爲先登，身被金夷，[54]不避死亡。賴蒙陛下神靈，且得延命沙漠，至今積三十年。骨肉生離，不復相識。所與相隨時人士衆，皆已物故。超年最長，今且七十。衰老被病，頭髮無黑，兩手不仁，[55]耳目不聦明，扶杖乃能行。雖欲竭盡其力，以報塞天恩，迫於歲暮，犬馬齒索。蠻夷之性，悖逆侮老，而超旦暮入地，乆不見代，恐開姦宄之源，生逆亂之心。而卿大夫咸懷一切，莫肯遠慮。如有卒暴，超之氣力不能從心，便爲上損國家累世之功，下棄忠臣竭力之用，誠可痛也。故超萬里歸誠，自陳苦急，延頸踰望，三年於今，未蒙省錄。[56]妾竊聞古者十五受兵，六十還之，[57]亦有休息不任職也。緣陛下以至孝理天下，得萬國之歡心，不遺小國之臣，況超得備侯伯之位，故敢觸死爲超求哀，匄超餘年。[58]一得生還，復見闕庭，使國永無勞遠之慮，西域無倉卒之憂，超得長蒙文王葬骨之恩，子方哀老之惠。[59]詩云：「民亦勞止，汔可小康，惠此中國，以綏四方。」[60]超有書與妾生訣，恐不復相見。妾誠傷超以壯年竭忠孝於沙漠，疲老則便捐死於曠野，誠可哀憐。如不蒙救護，超後有一旦之變，兾幸超家得蒙趙母、衛姬先請之貸。[61]妾愚戇不知大義，觸犯忌諱。

書奏，帝感其言，乃徵超還。

超在西域三十一歲。十四年八月至洛陽，拜爲射聲校尉。超素有匈脅疾，旣至，病遂加。帝遣中黃門問疾，賜醫藥。其年九月卒，年七十一。朝廷愍惜焉，使者弔祭，贈賵甚厚。子雄嗣。

初，超被徵，以戊己校尉任尚爲都護。與超交代。尚謂超曰：「君侯在外國三十餘年，而小人猥承君後，任重慮淺，宜有以誨之。」超曰：「年老失智，任君數當大位，豈班超所能及哉！必不得已，願進愚言。塞外吏士本非孝子順孫，皆以罪過徙補邊屯。而蠻夷懷鳥獸之心，難養易敗。今君性嚴急，水清無大魚，察政不得下和。[62]宜蕩佚簡易，寬小過，緫大綱而已。」超去後，尚私謂所親曰：「我以班君當有竒策，今所言平平耳。」尚至數年，而西域反亂，以罪被徵，如超所戒。

有三子。長子雄，累遷屯騎校尉。會叛羌寇三輔，詔雄將五營兵屯長安，就拜京兆尹。雄卒，子始嗣，尚清河孝王女陰城公主。主順帝之姑，貴驕淫亂，與嬖人居帷中，而召始入，使伏牀下。始積怒，永建五年，遂拔刃殺主。帝大怒，腰斬始，同產皆棄巿。超少子勇。

1951年4月19日被解職後在國會大廈發表的題為《老兵不死》著名演講。
老兵不死演講全文：
MacArthur: Farewell Address to Congress
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride — humility in the weight of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.
Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia’s past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.
Mustering half of the earth’s population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.
In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support — not imperious direction — the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war’s wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.
Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the literal line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore — with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore — and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.
Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.
Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The holding of this literal defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.
This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.
To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.
Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.
There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.
I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists’ support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war’s wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.
Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.
Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war’s terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them — as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.
On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.
With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President’s decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.
This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.
Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.
Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China’s coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.
For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.
We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.
Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
                "Men since the beginning of time have
                sought peace. Various methods through the
                ages have been attempted to devise an
                international process to prevent or settle
                disputes between nations. From the very
                start workable methods were found in so
                far as individual citizens were concerned,
                but the mechanics of an instrumentality of
                larger international scope have never
                been successful. Military alliances,
                balances of power, Leagues of Nations,
                all in turn failed, leaving the only path to
                be by way of the crucible of war. The
                utter destructiveness of war now blocks
                out this alternative. We have had our last
                chance. If we will not devise some
                greater and more equitable system,
                Armageddon will be at our door. The
                problem basically is theological and
                involves a spiritual recrudescence and
                improvement of human character that will
                synchronize with our almost matchless
                advances in science, art, literature, and all
                material and cultural developments of
                the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit
                if we are to save the flesh."   
But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.
War’s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory.
There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history’s clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.
"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.
Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.
The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy’s sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.
Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.
They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don’t scuttle the Pacific!"
I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.
It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.
Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.
I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."
And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.
Good Bye.